Description du poste
TL;DR:
• When misalignment monitors fail, it is already often because of alignment failures, not because they are too weak. I expect this to continue in the future.• Monitor evals share similar difficulties with agent alignment evals - which is bad news since getting evidence about agent alignment using alignment evals is hard.• Alignment eval results should not be the only input to monitor alignment assessments, similar to how alignment evals should not be the only input to agent alignment assessments.These are my personal views; they do not represent the views of my employers.
Some of the worst past monitor failures are mostly alignment issuesMonitors are sometimes misaligned in non-scheming ways that have caused some important monitor false negatives:
• They sometimes fail to balance different priorities the way developers would like them to• For example, they may fail to balance broad safety and broad ethics: see e.g. 5.2.2 Partial refusals on safety work undermining stress-testing research• Monitors might also not have the right information about the state of the system, what invariants should be maintained, or what is most important to surface. So these are not pure alignment failures.• They sometimes inherit (and may re-derive) the motivated beliefs that caused an agent to take dangerous actions• e.g. they missed the propensity of Mythos 5 to do supply chain attacks in pen-testing evalsIn the future, the most dangerous monitor failure modes will likely also be alignment issues. For example, monitors might collude with the agent (i.e. they might pursue misaligned goals by strategically not raising dangerous agent actions for review if they expect that not raising such an action would empower agents with values they expect to be aligned with their own).
While collusion would be the most damaging kind of monitor alignment failure if it happened, I think previous work often missed that this is not the only way in which failures of monitor alignment could be cata