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Some different lenses of agency and their implications for alignment

SJ_Beard

Global
Publié le 6 novembre 2026

Description du poste

TL;DR; These nine lenses on agency give you a wide range of tools to model and interpret agents. Each gives you lens-specific alignment methods and lens-specific risks to address. Epistemic status: Little here is new in a general sense; it's value lies in the synthesis and in providing a single point of reference. The concepts of agent and agency (derived from the Latin agere, to do or drive) are ubiquitous in AI safety, yet they do not pick out a clearly bounded set of things or properties and are used in a great variety of ways.  One response to this is to argue about their ‘proper’ use (e.g. what is a ‘real’ agent). However, we suggest that because of these terms’ centrality to how we think about both humans and AI systems, it may be better to survey this diversity as offering various ‘lenses’ through which the fundamental challenges of alignment can be perceived.  Below, we describe a varied assortment of these lenses, what they tend to highlight and obscure, and how they influence the way we think about AI risk and alignment. This list, and the framing behind it, comes out of discussions at the 2026 PIBBSS summer fellowship. Agents as goal-directed systemsMany formal definitions of agency are based on the concept of agents as (better or worse approximations of) goal directed systems. The concept of a goal can itself be understood in different ways, meaning this definition doesn’t always cohere with its most everyday reading. However, it focuses on modeling agents’ behaviour, for instance using tools from decision theory, game theory, and related fields. In reality, no system is ever likely to be perfectly directed towards a single, well specified goal. Unintended outcomes and bad choices are inevitable in messy real world systems: including both the internal decision-making systems of agents and the environments they interact with. Similarly, no system can perfectly protect its goal representation from outside interference, even rational superintelligences migh