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You might have childhood memories of this happening. Another kid in the playground grabs hold of one of your wrists and swings your own hand at your own face. He’s being very annoying and he taunts: “Stop hitting yourself! Stop hitting yourself!“ You’d prefer that it stops - but it is your own hand.
It turns out that if totalist aggregation counts subjectively identical copies of you separately, it too can work against the quality of your own experience, using the quantity of your own experience as a weapon.
This post presents arguments I’ve been developing for why identical copies should count only once in utilitarian aggregation. See Dai (2009) and Kent (2017) for related discussion; Egan (1994) and Alexander (2015) for fictional treatments; MacAskill and Tarsney (2026) for a view that discounts copies gradually by similarity; and Bostrom (2006) for a case against.
Quality vs. quantityPicture the following from the inside. Identify only with what you’re experiencing. And note what changes and what doesn’t change for you.
Suppose you’re implemented as one copy of yourself. You find yourself in extreme suffering. You’d like to suffer less. Fortunately, there’s a way to do that.
But then I say that lowering the intensity of your suffering comes with a side effect. You are currently one copy. The side effect is that the number of subjectively identical copies of yourself jumps to a million. They are subjectively identical copies, so nothing new is felt by anyone. Each copy is one more instance of what you already feel. By the end of it, you’re implemented as a million copies rather than one.
I say that this is worse under totalist aggregation. Total aggregated suffering would increase, I say. I can’t let you do that to yourself. So, because of this side effect of increasing the quantity of your experience, I can’t lower the intensity of your suffering.
Or consider the mirror case.
Suppose you’re implemented as one copy of yourself. You find yourself in extreme happine