Description du poste
Cross-posted from the Welfare Footprint Substack.
Separating what we feel from what merely moves us
Pain and pleasure are the most immediate components of our happiness and misery, yet few of us have ever asked what they exist for at all. When I put the question to audiences in workshops and talks, it is usually the first time they have considered it.
I am focusing on this because, for animal welfare science, affective states are, of course, central to welfare assessment. And the answer to the question above is that Pain and Pleasure exist to guide behavior. With them we are guided toward what tends to support survival and reproduction, and away from what tends to threaten them, an idea already stated by Darwin (1887). Food, suitable temperatures, shelter and sex feel good so we behave to get them. Being hurt, thirst, illness, extreme temperatures and threats feel bad and therefore we behave to avoid them.
If bad feelings tell us what to escape or prevent, and good feelings what to seek or repeat, then how strong they are becomes the currency by which we weigh the pros and cons of actions in the complicated world (Cabanac 1992). Depending on how intellectually complex organisms capable of feelings are, these computations increase in sophistication and so increase the effectiveness of actions (Alonso & Schuck-Paim 2025b). Our intellect is, ultimately, a computational device for making decisions as effectively as possible with information that is largely indexed by different levels of Pain and Pleasure.1
But are affective states the only form of behavioral guidance? Are there forms of guidance that predate them, from before sentience (the capacity to feel anything at all, good or bad) emerged? Even bacteria behave adaptively, and they are certainly not sentient. And after sentience emerged, were there other mechanisms that do not depend on Pain and Pleasure? Situating the affective layer within a larger evolutionary architecture of behavior also clarifies what Pain an