Description du poste
This is a linkpost for The Ethical Implications of Illusionism by Keith Frankish, which was published in Neuroethics on 20 May 2024. The abstract and a summary from Claude Opus 5.5 are below. Readers may also be interested in Losing Your Religion: Ethics After Illusionism, chapter 9 of the book "House of Mirrors: The Illusion of Phenomenal Consciousness" by François Kammerer.
AbstractIllusionism is a revisionary view of consciousness, which denies the existence of the phenomenal properties traditionally thought to render experience conscious. The view has theoretical attractions, but some think it also has objectionable ethical implications. They take illusionists to be denying the existence of consciousness itself, or at least of the thing that gives consciousness its ethical value, and thus as undermining our established ethical attitudes. This article responds to this objection. I argue that, properly understood, illusionism neither denies the existence of consciousness nor entails that consciousness does not ground ethical value. It merely offers a different account of what consciousness is and why it grounds ethical value. The article goes on to argue that the theoretical revision proposed by illusionists does have some indirect implications for our ethical attitudes but that these are wholly attractive and progressive ones. The illusionist perspective on consciousness promises to make ethical decision making easier and to extend the scope of our ethical concern. Illusionism is good news.
SummaryIllusionismFrankish contrasts illusionism with phenomenal realism, the view that experiences have an irreducibly subjective "what-it-is-likeness" known only to the subject by direct acquaintance. Realism faces the hard problem. Its theories of which systems are conscious range from humans only to fundamental particles and the whole universe, with no empirical way to test them.
Illusionists hold that experiences can be fully described in functional, third-person terms. T