Description du poste
Google DeepMind’s safety reports for new Gemini 4 models, Argon and Carbon, conclude that the models are “highly unlikely” to cause severe harm by evading oversight (p. 79). This conclusion “rests primarily on our ability to detect and intervene on harmful trajectories via CoT and action monitoring” (p. 89) – that is, they’re arguing for safety based on their control techniques, rather than alignment. We think that the arguments in these reports have serious weaknesses, and the reports overall don’t convince us that the risks of deploying these models have been mitigated reliably.
The biggest problems:
• GDM didn’t run any control evals on Carbon. Despite calling Carbon “our strongest model” with “significant gains across coding and agentic tasks” and “a significant leap in cybersecurity capabilities” in their launch post, GDM reused Argon’s monitor-evasion results on the grounds that Carbon “did not show meaningful new capabilities” (Carbon p. 42). Monitors flag Carbon several times less often than Argon in internal use (about 7x fewer confirmed alerts per session and 10x fewer per model call, Carbon p. 36), but GDM doesn’t demonstrate that this is due to decreased rates of misbehavior instead of increased monitor-evasion capability.• In control evals used to argue for monitorability, Argon evades realistic monitors about half the time. “Gemini 4 Argon can evade a realistic monitor on easy sabotage tasks about half the time when encouraged to do so” (p. 124), and around 64% of the time in a setting built on Google’s internal codebase. If these tasks were representative of real threat models, those results would surpass any reasonable red line.• GDM’s reason this is acceptable has almost no evidence behind it. GDM argues that causing real harm would be much harder than evading monitors on their test tasks, but they never measure how much harder. The backup defenses GDM relies on have serious gaps, some of which GDM acknowledges.• Training may have taught the models