Description du poste
BLUF: There’s a structural pull to overinvest in cosying up with frontier labs relative to publicly holding them to account. Now seems like a good time to rebalance.
When thinking about influencing an organisation (like, say, a frontier lab), it’s useful to distinguish between the inside game and the outside game. The inside game means trying to work with the insiders: building trust and influence with them, and looking for compromises. The outside game means applying external pressure: building broad political will and being willing to take a more adversarial posture.
In an ideal world, you do a mixture of the two: the good cop and the bad cop, the carrot and the stick, and so on. But AI safety does not have some single strategy. Instead, people self-sort based largely on local incentives and ambient pressures. And I think this disproportionately pulls towards the inside game.
Éminence Grise by Jean-Léon Gérôme
Clearly there’s a complex spectrum of inside-game-ness from literally working on post-training in a frontier lab to vocally calling for all labs to be shut down, and indeed it’s less like a single axis and more like a very high-dimensional space. Still, I think the rich tapestry of strategies is pretty well-approximated by a single sliding scale, and that things pull closer to the inside than is optimal, e.g. junior safety researchers erring on the side of caution when it comes to criticising frontier labs.
Before getting into my guesses for why, let me start by observing some ways that the inside game has been historically more powerful and higher status:
• Coefficient Giving, by far the largest funder, is also really inside game• Historically one of their largest grants was buying an OpenAI board seat (possibly more than all TAIS spending at the time)• Their governance spending is basically all inside game — they’ve never directly funded e.g. pause advocacy• This probably gets more extreme with the huge wave of additional AI safety funding from Anthropic e