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Incomplete agents want to become complete

Celene Nightingale

Global
Publié le 21 novembre 2026

Description du poste

Written by Celene Nightingale, with assistance from AprilSR. The Von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms are completeness, transitivity, continuity, and independence. From these, we derive EU-maximizing behavior and the consequences thereof. VNM axioms are typically justified by money-pump arguments showing that agents in violation of them either have their money consistently taken away from them, or fail to exploit opportunities to consistently gain more money. Nevertheless, some of these arguments are weaker than others, and many choose to reject one or more of the axioms. Tetraspace rejects continuity,[1] Garrabrant rejects independence, and Thornley rejects completeness. John Wentworth argues in favor of completeness in Why not subagents?, as well as in various comment sections. Here, I present a simplified framing which is (hopefully) easier to understand. What is completeness?Completeness states that, given two options X and Y, you must either prefer X to Y, prefer Y to X, or be indifferent between X and Y. At first, it might seem difficult to imagine an agent which behaves any other way. However, in There are no coherence theorems, Elliott Thornley argues: Here’s the important point missing from this thought: there are two ways of failing to have a strict preference between X and Y. Being indifferent between X and Y is one way: preferring X at least as much as Y and preferring Y at least as much as X. Having a preferential gap between X and Y is another way: not preferring X at least as much as Y and not preferring Y at least as much as X. If an agent has a preferential gap between any two lotteries, then their preferences violate Completeness. One might say that the agent is not indifferent between X and Y, but finds them incommensurable. The difference between indifference and incommensurability is that indifference is sensitive to sweetening/souring, whereas incommensurability is not. For example, let's say Alice is having trouble picking between two job offers, o