Description du poste
I here make the case against smoking in the Smoking Lesion, a hypothetical decision scenario (where smoking doesn't cause cancer) studied in decision theory. For the case against smoking in real life (where smoking does cause cancer), see, for example, the Wikipedia article on the health effects of tobacco or the Cleveland Clinic article about smoking.
I assume basic familiarity with the debate about Newcomb’s problem and the basic mechanisms of evidential and causal decision theory (EDT and CDT). I assume some sympathy with one-boxing.
The Smoking Lesion goes as follows:
Some people have a genetic lesion that causes cancer and also makes them more likely to smoke. As a result, smokers get cancer much more often than non-smokers. Unlike in the real world, smoking itself doesn't cause cancer. You don't know whether you have the lesion. You enjoy smoking, but cancer is much worse than smoking is pleasant. Should you smoke?
People usually use the Smoking Lesion to argue against EDT. In particular, they claim that EDT reasons as follows: Smoking is evidence that you have the lesion. So conditional on smoking, you're more likely to get cancer than conditional on not smoking. Since cancer is much worse than smoking is pleasant, you shouldn't smoke.
People typically take this reasoning to be mistaken. They then conclude that EDT is wrong and turn to some other kind of decision theory that doesn’t use conditionals in the way that EDT does. (Some people still try to get their new theory to one-box. Examples of such theories are timeless decision theory (TDT), functional decision theory (FDT), and Spohn's version of CDT (Spohn 2012). Others take the Smoking Lesion to be a reductio ad absurdum of one-boxing and thus end up endorsing a theory like CDT that two-boxes.)
The mainline response of the EDT advocate is the so-called tickle defense (see, e.g., Oesterheld 2018 for an overview). The tickle defense aims to argue that for any realistic version of the Smoking Lesion,